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Abstract: 
We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka 
and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same 
subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which 
the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. 
We find little evidence of order effects in our experiment.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A growing number of studies in economics appeal to the influence of social norms to explain 
behaviors that are difficult to reconcile with models of rational choice, where individuals are 
assumed to care exclusively about their own material gain (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; 
López-Pérez, 2008; Allcott, 2011; Nikiforakis et al., 2012; Gächter et al., 2013; Krupka and 
Weber, 2013; Reuben and Riedl, 2013). A recent development in experimental economics has 
allowed researchers to move toward a more objective approach to the identification and 
measurement of social norms. Krupka and Weber (2013) have introduced a norm-elicitation task 
that allows an incentive-compatible elicitation of subjects' normative judgments of what 
constituted appropriate behavior in a given decision context. In this method subjects are shown a 
list of actions available to a decision-maker in a given situation and are asked to evaluate whether 
each action is "socially appropriate" or "socially inappropriate". Subjects are given material 
incentives to coordinate their evaluation with that of other participants in the experiment. Thus, 
subjects have an incentive to reveal their perception of what is collectively recognized as 
appropriate behavior in the situation (i.e. the social norm), rather than their own personal views 
of appropriateness.1 
The Krupka-Weber elicitation method has been recently used to explain individual 
behavior in a variety of decision settings, including dictator games (Krupka et al., 2012; Krupka 
and Weber, 2013; Erkut et al., 2015), gift-exchange games (Gächter et al., 2013), and oligopoly 
pricing games (Krupka et al., 2012).2 These applications are based on between-subject designs 
whereby the group of subjects who are asked to identify the social norms that apply to the 
decision situation under study differ from the group of subjects who make choices in that 
situation and whose behavior the researcher intends to explain using the elicited norms.  
However, within-subject designs (where norms and behavior are elicited from the same 
group of subjects) may offer a number of advantages over between-subject designs for testing the 
explanatory power of social norms. First, within-subject designs allow to control for the effects 
                                           
1 This is important as social norms are collectively recognized rules of behavior. Ostrom (2000), for example, 
defines norms as "shared understandings about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden" (pp. 143-144). 
Elster (1989) emphasizes that for "norms to be social, they must be shared by other people" (p. 99). 
2 The Krupka-Weber method has also been used outside of a laboratory context, to explain the on-the-job behavior 
of financial advisers (Burks and Krupka, 2012). 
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of idiosyncrasies in the subject pools used for the measurement of norms and behavior. Cultural, 
socio-economic, and demographic factors can all have systematic influences on normative 
judgments and behavior. If the characteristics of the subjects involved in the norm-elicitation task 
are different from those of the subjects whose behavior is observed, the explanatory power of the 
elicited norms may be reduced. Moreover, within-subject designs offer the opportunity to address 
questions that may not be answered with a between-subject design. For example, in a within-
subject design a researcher may examine whether subjects who behave in violation of a given 
norm of conduct, do so because they fail to recognize the relevant norm, or rather because they 
are not sufficiently motivated to follow norms despite being able to identify them. Clearly, for 
this analysis, one needs to correlate normative evaluations and behavior elicited from the same 
subjects.  
However, one serious obstacle to the use of within-subject designs for the elicitation of 
social norms is that the order in which the norm-elicitation and behavioral experiments are 
conducted may systematically affect the elicited norms and behavior. On the one hand, eliciting 
norms after having elicited behavior may introduce systematic biases in the measurement of 
norms. For instance, subjects may be prone to self-serving judgment biases whereby they 
manipulate their evaluation of what constitutes appropriate behavior in a given situation to 
reconcile it with the choices that they have previously made in that situation. In fact, several 
studies have found evidence of such "moral hypocrisy" and self-serving biases in fairness 
judgments (e.g., Konow, 2005; Croson and Konow, 2009; Rustichini and Villeval, 2014). On the 
other hand, eliciting norms before eliciting behavior may systematically affect subjects' choices. 
Theories of social norms (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; Bicchieri, 2000) emphasize that norm 
compliance requires that norms are salient and that subjects' attention is focused on the rules of 
appropriate behavior. Eliciting normative judgments before asking subjects to make a choice in a 
given situation may focus their attention on the norms that prevail in that situation, and may thus 
affect behavior. In fact, Krupka and Weber (2009) find that dictator giving increases when 
dictators are asked to report their fairness views before making a choice.  
In the next section we describe an experiment where we test these order effects in the 
elicitation of norms. We focus on norms that regulate corrupt behavior. We use a version of the 
bribe game introduced by Cameron et al. (2009) to study subjects' propensity to offer and accept 
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bribes, and to sanction corrupt behavior. We use the Krupka-Weber method described above to 
elicit subjects' normative views about such behaviors. In one treatment we elicit norms of 
corruption before asking subjects to make a choice in the bribe game. In another treatment we 
elicit behavior in the bribe game before eliciting norms of corruption.  
We report our results in Section 3. Overall, our experiment delivers little evidence of order 
effects in our within-subject design. The norms elicited from subjects who had not yet played the 
game are not systematically different from those elicited from subjects who had previously 
played the game. As we discuss in more detail in Section 4, this result is in line with recent 
findings from Erkut et al. (2015), who find that norms of dictator giving elicited from "impartial 
spectators", who have not played the game, are similar to those elicited from "stakeholders", who 
played the game before reporting their views. We also find little evidence that eliciting norms 
affects subsequent behavior in the bribe game. This result is at odds with the findings reported by 
Krupka and Weber (2009), and more in line with the mixed findings reported by Bicchieri and 
Chavez (2010) in the context of an ultimatum game.  
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
All sessions of the experiment consisted of two parts. In one part we elicited subjects' normative 
views of corruption using the norm-elicitation task introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013, 
hereafter KW). In the other part subjects played a version of the bribe game adapted from 
Cameron et al. (2009, hereafter CCEG).  
The norm-elicitation task was used to elicit subjects’ perceptions of the appropriateness of 
engaging in corrupt behavior and punishing bribery. Normative judgments were elicited using the 
KW method for measuring social norms. Subjects were described a scenario involving an act of 
corruption (a firm manager offering a bribe to a public official to obtain advantages for their firm) 
and an act of punishment of corrupt behavior (by a citizen blowing the whistle on the bribe 
exchange between the manager and the public official). Subjects were then asked to judge 
whether the actions in the scenario were “socially appropriate” and “consistent with moral or 
proper social behavior”, or “socially inappropriate” and “inconsistent with moral or proper social 
behavior”. Subjects received a monetary reward if their appropriateness judgments matched the 
judgments provided by others. As discussed in KW, this gives subjects an incentive to reveal 
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what they perceive to be the jointly recognized perceptions of the appropriateness of the 
behaviors described in the scenario, and not their own personal perception of appropriateness.3  
We used the KW task to elicit judgments of appropriateness of four different actions: i) a 
firm manager's decision to offer a bribe to a public official; ii) the public official's decision to 
accept the bribe; iii) a citizen's decision to punish the firm for offering the bribe; and iv) the 
citizen's decision to punish the public official for accepting the bribe. In each case, subjects 
evaluated whether the action was “very socially inappropriate”, “somewhat socially 
inappropriate”, “somewhat socially appropriate”, or “very socially appropriate”. At the end of the 
experiment subjects were randomly paired with one other participant in the session. For each 
action, subjects received a payment of 0.5 GBP if their appropriateness judgment of the action 
matched that of the other person in the pair. 
In the other part of the experiment subjects played a version of the three-person bribe game 
introduced by CCEG.4 At the beginning of the game subjects are randomly matched in groups of 
three. Within each group subjects are randomly assigned to one of three possible roles: firm, 
public official, or citizen. The game is played as shown in Figure 1.5 
                                           
3 The material incentives used in the task generate a coordination game with multiple equilibria. KW argue that 
jointly recognized social norms create focal points in this game, which subjects are likely to exploit to successfully 
coordinate. See KW for a discussion on this point. A similar approach has also been used by Xiao and Houser (2005) 
and Houser and Xiao (2011) to obtain incentive-compatible classifications of natural language messages. 
4 Our game is a version of the welfare-reducing bribe game used by CCEG, where the combined gains from bribery 
to the firm and the official are lower than the negative externality accruing to the citizen. Thus, in this game 
corruption is not justified by any efficiency motive. 
5 All payoff amounts are in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). At the end of the experiment ECUs payoffs were 
converted into GBP at the following rates: 6 ECUs = 1 GBP for the firm, 4 ECUs = 1 GBP for the official and 3 
ECUs = 1 GBP for the citizen. As in CCEG, the choice of conversion rates was aimed at keeping expected earnings 
comparable across roles. 
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Figure 1 – The bribe game 
 
The firm moves first and decides whether to initiate a corrupt act, by offering a bribe to the 
official. If the firm decides to offer a bribe, she has to choose a bribe amount   =
{4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. Offering the bribe implies a cost of 2 to the firm, regardless of whether the bribe is 
accepted. If accepted, the bribe increases the firm’s payoff by 3 . The public official moves next: 
she observes whether the firm has offered a bribe and, if so, decides whether to accept it or not. 
Accepting the bribe is profitable for the official, whose payoff is also increased by 3 , but 
implies a  negative externality on society, captured by a reduction of 7  in the citizen’s payoff. 
The citizen moves last. She observes the firm's and official's decisions and is given the 
opportunity to blow the whistle to punish corrupt behavior. In particular, if the firm has offered a 
bribe and this has been accepted by the official, the citizen can sanction the firm and the official, 
by choosing punishment amounts    = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and    = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, 
respectively. Punishment is costly for the citizen as the total amount punished    +    is 
subtracted respectively from the citizen's payoff. Punishment also reduces the firm's and official's 
payoffs by 3   and 3  , respectively.  
We implemented a one-shot version of this game, using the strategy method to elicit the 
official's and citizen's decisions. In particular, for each possible bribe amount that the firm may 
offer, officials indicated whether or not they would accept that bribe. Similarly, for each possible 
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bribe amount, citizens indicated their punishment choices in case the official accepted that bribe. 
These choices were collected in an incentive-compatible way: the firm's actual bribing decision 
determined which of the official's choices (if any) was actually relevant. This in turn determined 
which of the citizen's punishment decisions (if any) was relevant for the computation of payoffs.  
We have two between-subject treatments where we varied the order in which the two tasks 
are performed. In our “NormFirst” treatment, subjects first participated in the norm elicitation 
task and then played the bribe game. In the “BehaviorFirst” treatment the order of tasks was 
reversed: subjects first played the bribe game and then participated in the norm elicitation task. In 
both treatments subjects were informed of the two-part structure of the experiment at the 
beginning of the session, but they were not given any information about the second part until 
everyone had completed the first part. Moreover, subjects completed the second part of the 
experiment without receiving any information on outcomes from the first part. 
The normative judgments collected in the NormFirst treatment are elicited from subjects 
who had not previously participated in a game that reproduces the scenario they were asked to 
evaluate. Thus, the NormFirst treatment gives us a benchmark impartial measurement of social 
norms regulating corrupt behavior. In contrast, subjects in the BehaviorFirst treatment submitted 
their normative judgments after having made choices in the bribe game. As discussed above, this 
may bias their judgments of appropriateness, e.g. by inducing subjects to modify their responses 
to justify the actions they have taken in the game. Our experiment allows us to measure the 
extent of such judgment biases by comparing the norms elicited from the “impartial spectators” 
in the NormFirst treatment with those elicited from subjects who had previously played the bribe 
game in the role of firm, public official or citizen in the BehaviorFirst treatment. 
Subjects in the NormFirst treatment participated in the bribe game after having been asked 
to think about the social appropriateness of offering and accepting bribes as well as punishing 
corrupt behavior. As discussed above, focusing subjects on normative considerations may 
increase norm compliance and distort behavior relative to a case where subjects’ attention has not 
been drawn to the norm. Thus, to measure the extent to which participation in the norm 
elicitation task affects subsequent behavior, we compare subjects’ choices in the bribe game in 
the NormFirst treatment with those in the BehaviorFirst treatment, where subjects were not 
primed to think about norms of corruption before playing the game.  
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Overall, 204 subjects participated in the experiment, 102 subjects (= 34 groups) in each 
treatment. Of these, 33% were students of economics, finance, or management, and 51% were 
females. The experiment was computerized using the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and 
subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). All sessions were conducted at the 
Birmingham Experimental Economics Laboratory of the University of Birmingham. At the 
beginning of a session, subjects received preliminary instructions that were read aloud by the 
experimenter.6 Subjects then received instructions for part one, which were also read aloud. After 
the experimenter had dealt with any questions in private, part one of the experiment began. Once 
every participant had completed the first part of the experiment, subjects received instructions for 
part two. These were again read aloud and any questions were dealt in private by the 
experimenter. At the end of part two, subjects completed a brief questionnaire collecting basic 
demographic and socioeconomic information. Each session lasted approximately 1 hour, and 
subjects earned, on average, £19.94 including a show-up fee of £ 2.50. 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 The effect of game play on elicited norms 
In this sub-section we examine whether making choices in the bribe game affects subjects' 
subsequent normative judgments about offering and accepting bribes and punishing corrupt 
behavior. Figure 2 shows the average appropriateness ratings elicited from subjects in the 
BehaviorFirst and NormFirst treatment. In the former case, we distinguish between ratings 
elicited from subjects who took the role of firm, public official, or citizen in the bribe game.7 In 
the latter case, this is not needed because subjects had not participated in the bribery game when 
norms were elicited (and thus, assignment to specific roles had not taken place yet). Table 1 
reports the full distributions of ratings collected in our treatments.  
                                           
6 The experimental instructions are reproduced in the Supplementary Material. 
7 Mean ratings were constructed by converting responses into numerical scores using the same scale used by KW: 
“very socially inappropriate” = -1, “somewhat socially inappropriate” = -1/3, “somewhat socially appropriate” = 1/3, 
“very socially appropriate” = 1. 
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Figure 2 – Mean appropriateness ratings across treatments 
 
Table 1 – Appropriateness ratings across treatments 
 Firm Official 
Action Mean -- - + ++ Mean -- - + ++ 
OfferBribe -0.75 68% 26% 6% 0% -0.65 53% 41% 6% 0% 
AcceptBribe -0.84 79% 18% 3% 0% -0.80 76% 18% 6% 0% 
PunishFirm 0.80 0% 3% 24% 73% 0.90 0% 0% 15% 85% 
PunishOfficial 0.77 0% 3% 29% 68% 0.88 0% 0% 18% 82% 
 Citizen NormFirst 
Action Mean -- - + ++ Mean -- - + ++ 
OfferBribe -0.80 76% 18% 6% 0% -0.80 80% 12% 6% 2% 
AcceptBribe -0.82 76% 21% 3% 0% -0.77 76% 14% 8% 2% 
PunishFirm 0.78 0% 0% 32% 68% 0.79 1% 1% 27% 71% 
PunishOfficial 0.78 0% 0% 32% 68% 0.82 1% 2% 21% 76% 
Note: responses are “very socially inappropriate” (--), “somewhat socially inappropriate” (-), 
“somewhat socially appropriate” (+), “very socially appropriate” (++). Modal responses are shaded.  
The elicited ratings are remarkably similar across treatments. Both the impartial normative 
judgments elicited in the NormFirst treatment and those elicited in BehaviorFirst show that a 
large majority of subjects think that offering and accepting bribes is very socially inappropriate. 
Whistle blowing and the punishment of corrupt behavior are instead viewed as very socially 
appropriate decisions by most subjects in either treatment. Moreover, within the BehaviorFirst 
treatment, we observe little differences between ratings collected from firms, public officials, and 
citizens. In all cases, the modal response by either type of subject coincides with that in the 
NormFirst treatment. 
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We formally analyze the responses in the different treatments by using Fisher’s 
randomization tests.8 We start by comparing, for each of the four actions, the ratings elicited in 
the NormFirst treatment with those elicited in the BehaviorFirst treatment, without distinction as 
to the role taken in the bribe game. For each action, we do not detect statistically significant 
differences between ratings elicited in the NormFirst and BehaviorFirst treatments (all p > 0.270).  
We next compare the ratings elicited in NormFirst with those elicited either from firms, 
public officials, or citizens in BehaviorFirst. Eleven of the twelve possible comparisons are 
statistically insignificant at the 10% level, according to Fisher’s randomization tests. The 
exception occurs for the action OfferBribe, which subjects in the role of public official in 
BehaviorFirst rated as relatively less inappropriate than subjects in NormFirst (p = 0.097). 
However, this result must be interpreted with caution due to the multiple testing problem, which 
increases the overall type I error rate. None of the statistical comparisons is significant if we 
apply a Bonferroni correction to account for the multiple testing. 
We further analyze the ratings using regression analysis to control for differences in 
observable characteristics of the subjects. Table 2 reports ordered logit regressions of the 
normative ratings of the four actions evaluated by subjects. Among the independent variables, we 
include three dummy variables for subjects in the BehaviorFirst treatment who took the role of 
firm, public official, and citizen, respectively. Thus, subjects in the NormFirst treatment are used 
as the reference category. The regressions also include control variables for subjects' gender ("1 
if female"), age ("Age"), field of study ("1 if economics, business, or finance"), political 
orientation ("Right political orientation"), and experience with corruption ("Corruption 
experience").9 Results are displayed as factor changes in the odds of rating an action as more 
socially appropriate. Note that a factor change greater than 1 implies a positive effect on the odds, 
whereas a factor change smaller than 1 implies a negative effect. 
The regressions confirm that normative ratings are by and large unaffected by previous 
experience with play in the bribe game. In eleven out of twelve cases we do not detect 
statistically significant differences between ratings in the NormFirst and BehaviorFirst treatments. 
                                           
8 See Moir (1998) for a discussion of the randomization test. 
9 Political orientation was measured asking subjects where they viewed themselves on the political spectrum on a 
scale from 1 (= left of the political spectrum) to 7 (= right of the political spectrum). Experience with corruption was 
measured as the number of times subjects had heard about corruption (either in the news or through personal 
experience) over the previous year. 
11 
 
The regressions confirm that the only exception occurs for public officials, who rate the action of 
offering a bribe as less inappropriate than the impartial spectators of the NormFirst treatment. 
The regressions also reveal an interesting difference between normative ratings of male and 
female subjects. Females seem to hold relatively weaker norms against corruption than males. 
They rate the actions of offering and accepting bribes as less socially inappropriate than men. 
Moreover, women view the actions of punishing corrupt behavior as less socially appropriate 
than men.  In all cases the effect is statistical significant at the 5% level. 
Table 2 - Regression analysis of normative ratings 
 OfferBribe AcceptBribe PunishFirm PunishOfficial 
BehaviorFirst - Firm 1.70 0.80 1.04 0.66 
 (0.75) (0.39) (0.51) (0.30) 
BehaviorFirst - Public Official 3.10*** 1.15 2.15 1.46 
 (1.25) (0.55) (1.20) (0.74) 
BehaviorFirst - Citizen 1.34 1.06 0.73 0.60 
 (0.66) (0.51) (0.31) (0.26) 
1 if female 1.95** 2.37** 0.45** 0.51** 
 (0.65) (0.87) (0.15) (0.17) 
Age 0.85 0.83 1.03 1.11 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) 
1 if economics, business,  0.92 0.48 1.95 1.25 
or finance (0.34) (0.22) (0.82) (0.48) 
Right political orientation 1.20 1.13 0.97 0.92 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) 
Corruption experience  0.98 0.81 0.87 0.87 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
Pseudo-R2 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 
N 204 204 204 204 
Note: Ordered logit regressions, robust standard errors in parentheses. Subjects in the NormFirst treatment are 
used as the reference category. Results are displayed as factor changes in the odds of rating an action as more 
socially appropriate. Factor changes greater than 1 imply a positive effect on the odds, while factor changes 
smaller than 1 imply a negative effect. Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.  
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3.2 The effect of norm elicitation on game play  
In this sub-section we examine whether asking subjects to report their views about norms of 
corruption affects their subsequent behavior in the bribe game. To do so, we compare the 
behavior of subjects in the NormFirst treatment with that of subjects in the BehaviorFirst 
treatment, who made choices in the bribe game without being previously asked to think about the 
social appropriateness of their actions. Figures 3, 4 and 5 summarize the behavior of firms, 
public officials, and citizens in the two treatments of the experiment. 
Starting with the behavior of firms, 27% of firms chose not to offer any bribe to the public 
official in the BehaviorFirst treatment. The proportion of non-bribing firms in NormFirst is 32%. 
This difference is not statistically significant according to a    test (p = 0.595). Figure 3 shows 
the mean bribe amount offered by firms between the two treatments. Firms offered on average a 
bribe of 5.29 to public official in BehaviorFirst and 4.78 in NormFirst. This difference is not 
statistically significant according to a Fisher’s randomization test (p = 0.583). 
Figure 3 – Mean bribe offered by firms 
 
Figure 4 shows the proportion of public officials who were prepared to accept a bribe of a 
given amount. In both treatments, the acceptance rate increases in the amount offered as a bribe: 
only about half of the public officials were willing to accept the lowest bribe amount of 4, but  
about 80% were willing to accept the highest bribe amount of 8. Acceptance rates are very 
similar between the two treatments. In fact, for any bribe amount, we do not detect any 
significant differences between the proportion of public officials accepting the bribe in 
BehaviorFirst and NormFirst (   tests, all p ≥ 0.329). 
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Figure 4 – Proportion of public officials accepting bribes 
 
Figure 5 shows the average punishment that citizens meted out against firms (left panel) 
and public officials (right panel). Starting with citizens' punishment against firms, in 
BehaviorFirst this averages between 1.2 and 1.4 depending on the bribe offered, although there is 
no clear monotonic relation between punishment and bribe amount. In NormFirst the punishment 
amount increases monotonically in the bribe offered: average punishment increases from 1.03 
when firms offer the lowest possible bribe to 2.35 when firms offer the highest possible bribe. 
We analyze differences in punishment behavior between treatments using Fisher’s randomization 
tests. When firms offer a bribe of 4, 5, 6 or 7 we do not detect any significant differences 
between punishments in the BehaviorFirst and NormFirst treatments (all p ≥ 0.195). We detect a 
weakly significant difference in punishment behavior when firms offer a bribe of 8 (p = 0.062). 
However, none of the statistical comparisons is significant if we apply a Bonferroni correction to 
account for the multiple testing. 
Turning to citizens' punishment against public officials, Figure 5 shows that in both 
treatments there is a weakly positive correlation between punishment and bribe amount. Figure 5 
also shows that punishment behavior is very similar across treatments. In fact, using Fisher’s 
randomization tests we do not detect any statistically significant differences in punishments 
between treatments for any bribe amount (all p ≥ 0.689). 
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Figure 5 – Mean punishment assigned by citizens to firms (left) and public officials (right) 
  
We further examine these effects using regression analysis. Table 3 reports results of OLS 
and Logit regressions of the amount offered as bribe by firms (model I), public officials' 
acceptance of bribes (model II), and citizens' punishment decisions (models III and IV). In all 
models we include a dummy variable taking value 1 for observations collected in the NormFirst 
treatment and 0 otherwise. Thus, subjects in the BehaviorFirst treatment are used as the reference 
category. In models II, III and IV we observe, for each participant, a collection of acceptance or 
punishment decisions, one for each possible bribe amount offered by the firm. Thus, in these 
models we interact the treatment dummy with dummy variables measuring the bribe offered by 
the firm. In all models we also include controls for gender, age, field of study, political 
orientation, and experience with corruption. 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
4 5 6 7 8
M
ea
n
 p
u
n
is
h
m
en
t 
to
 fi
rm
 
Bribe - Amount Offered
BehaviorFirst NormFirst
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
4 5 6 7 8
M
ea
n
 p
u
n
is
h
m
en
t 
to
 o
ff
ic
ia
l
Bribe - Amount Offered
BehaviorFirst NormFirst
15 
 
Table 3 - Regression analysis of behavior in the bribe game 
 I II III IV 
 
Firms' bribe 
offers 
Public officials' 
bribe 
acceptance 
Citizens' 
punishment of 
firms 
Citizens' 
punishment of 
public officials 
 (OLS) (Logit) (OLS) (OLS) 
NormFirst -0.49 0.98 -0.23 0.14 
 (0.86) (0.50) (0.45) (0.49) 
Bribe = 5 -- 1.46 -0.03 0.12 
  (0.54) (0.21) (0.23) 
Bribe = 6 -- 3.56*** 0.15 0.21 
  (1.74) (0.31) (0.31) 
Bribe = 7 -- 5.40** -0.09 0.35 
  (3.60) (0.35) (0.35) 
Bribe = 8 -- 2.99** -0.06 0.50 
  (1.60) (0.36) (0.39) 
NormFirst * Bribe = 5 -- 0.69 0.44 0.00 
  (0.33) (0.27) (0.30) 
NormFirst * Bribe = 6 -- 1.39 0.65 0.15 
  (1.01) (0.41) (0.46) 
NormFirst * Bribe = 7 -- 0.63 0.97** 0.09 
  (0.58) (0.44) (0.47) 
NormFirst * Bribe = 8 -- 1.36 1.38** -0.06 
  (1.09) (0.52) (0.54) 
1 if female -1.65* 0.47** 0.23 -0.20 
 (0.89) (0.17) (0.45) (0.43) 
Age 0.52 1.07 -0.10 -0.07 
 (0.37) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) 
1 if economics, business,  0.18 1.34 -0.22 0.24 
or finance (1.13) (0.45) (0.49) (0.55) 
Right political orientation -0.15 0.84 -0.13 -0.14 
 (0.33) (0.12) (0.18) (0.16) 
Corruption experience  0.35 1.04 -0.17 -0.00 
 (0.38) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19) 
Constant  -4.71 -- 4.30** 3.12* 
 (7.14)  (1.65) (1.81) 
R2 / Pseudo-R2 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.03 
N. 68 340 340 340 
Note: OLS and logit regressions, robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the individual level in models 
II, III and IV). Subjects in the BehaviorFirst treatment are used as the reference category. In model II results are 
displayed as factor changes in the odds of accepting the bribe (note that for this reason we omitted from the 
regression table the constant included in the mode). Factor changes greater than 1 imply a positive effect on the 
odds, while factor changes smaller than 1 imply a negative effect. Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.  
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The regressions confirm that, in most cases, choices collected in the NormFirst treatment 
are not significantly different from those collected in the BehaviorFirst treatment. The only 
exception occurs for citizens' decisions to punish firms when these offered a bribe of 7 or 8. In 
this case, the regressions show that citizens punish more heavily firms in the NormFirst than 
BehaviorFirst treatment. Both effects are significant at the 5% level. 
Most of the control variables included in the regression have no explanatory power. The 
exception occurs for the gender dummy in the regressions of firms' and public officials' behavior. 
Women offer smaller bribes and are less likely to accept bribes than men. These results stand in 
contrast with the findings reported above about women's normative views of corrupt behavior. 
While women seem to find corrupt behavior less socially inappropriate than men, they tend to 
engage less often in this type of behavior. These conflicting results are puzzling, but perhaps not 
entirely surprising in view of the mixed evidence of gender effects in previous corruption 
experiments. CCEG, for example, find that women are less likely to offer bribes, but they do not 
find any differences between men and women in the acceptance of bribes. Moreover, Alatas et al. 
(2009a) analyze in more detail the gender differences in the CCEG experiment and find that 
CCEG results are mainly driven by the behavior of Australian subjects, whereas no gender 
differences are observed among subjects recruited in India, Indonesia and Singapore.10 They 
conclude that gender differences may be culture specific. Overall, our data, and the results from 
previous studies, suggest that there may not be a straightforward relation between gender and 
corrupt behavior.  
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we tested the effects of eliciting social norms of appropriate behavior in within-
subject designs where the same subjects make a choice and express a judgment about appropriate 
behavior in a given decision setting. We have considered two possible effects. On the one hand, 
eliciting normative judgments after having asked subjects to make a choice in a decision setting 
may distort the measurement of norms because subjects may be prone to self-serving biases in 
judgment that lead them to adapt their view of what constituted appropriate behavior to justify 
                                           
10 However, Alatas et al. (2009b) conduct a similar experiment among Indonesian public servants and students and 
do find that male subjects are more likely to bribe than females. They do not find any differences in the propensity to 
accept bribes. 
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their choices in the decision situation. On the other hand, eliciting normative judgments before 
subjects take a choice in the decision setting may affect their behavior as this may draw subjects' 
attention to the relevant social norms and encourage norm compliance. 
We test these effects in a version of the bribe game originally introduced by Cameron et al. 
(2009). We elicit social norms using the method introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). In one 
treatment subjects play the bribe game first and then report judgments of appropriateness in the 
Krupka-Weber task. In the other treatment, the order of the two tasks is reversed, i.e. subjects 
participate in the Krupka-Weber task first, and then play the bribe game. 
We find that norms elicited from subjects who had previous experience with the decision 
situation they are asked to evaluate are not systematically different from norms elicited from 
"impartial spectators", who report their judgments of appropriateness before having played the 
game. This result is in line with the findings reported by Erkut et al. (2015), who also test 
whether the Krupka-Weber method is robust to judgment biases in the context of a dictator game 
experiment. We also find little evidence that focusing subjects on social norms of corruption 
affects their subsequent behavior in the bribe game. This result contrasts with the findings 
reported by Krupka and Weber (2009), who show that, in a binary dictator game, dictators 
behave more generously when they are asked to report their beliefs about norms of giving prior 
to making their choices.11 On the other hand, and more in line with our results, Bicchieri and 
Chavez (2010) find mixed support for the hypothesis that focusing subjects' attention on fairness 
norms in an ultimatum game affects the amount proposers offer to responders.  
Taken together, our results and findings from previous studies suggest that normative 
judgments elicited using the Krupka-Weber task are robust to self-serving biases whereby 
individuals may tend to adjust their moral views to accommodate their past actions. Existing 
findings paint instead a more mixed picture of the effects of eliciting norms from subjects who 
are about to make decisions in related decision settings. On balance, if researchers intend to elicit 
social norms using a within-subject design, the evidence from our study and the existing 
literature suggests that this is less likely to generate distortions in responses if norms of 
appropriate behavior are elicited after subjects have made a choice in the decision situation. 
                                           
11 Also related are the findings by Cialdini et al. (1990). They show that people are more likely to litter in clean, non-
littered environments than in environments that contain one single piece of litter. Their interpretation is that the 
single piece of litter draws subjects' attention on the anti-littering norm and thus increases norm compliance. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL – EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 
Below we report the instructions used in the experiment. The instructions were used in the 
BehaviorFirst treatment, In the NormFirst treatment the order of Part 1 and Part 2 was inverted. 
 
 
PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS 
Welcome! You are about to take part in a decision-making experiment. This experiment is run by the “Birmingham 
Experimental Economics Laboratory” and has been financed by various research foundations. Just for showing up 
you have already earned £2.50. You can earn additional money depending on the decisions made by you and other 
participants. It is therefore very important that you read these instructions with care. 
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any questions, or need 
assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out 
loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your following of these 
rules. 
We will first jointly go over the instructions. After we have read the instructions, you will have time to ask clarifying 
questions. We would like to stress that any choices you make in this experiment are entirely anonymous. Please do 
not touch the computer or its mouse until you are instructed to do so. Thank you. 
This experiment consists of two different parts, PART 1 and PART 2. In each part you will be asked to make one or 
more decisions and will have a chance to earn money. The amount of money you will earn in each part of the 
experiment will depend on your decisions and may depend on other participants’ decisions. The total amount you 
will earn from the experiment will be the sum of the earnings you make in the two parts of the experiment. You will 
be informed about your earnings from the two parts of the experiment only at the end of the session. Therefore, in 
PART 2, everyone will make their decisions without knowing any outcome from PART 1. Attached with these 
preliminary instructions, you find the instructions for PART 1 of the experiment. You will receive new instructions 
for PART 2 once everyone in the room has completed PART 1. 
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PART 1 
General Instructions 
In PART 1 of today’s experiment, participants are divided into groups of three. You will therefore be in a group with 
2 other participants. You will be presented with a real-life-like situation where you will be randomly assigned to the 
role of the Manager of a Firm, a Government Official, or a Citizen. Your role will be randomly assigned to you by 
the computer and will be shown to you on the computer screen. We ask you to assume the role assigned to you as 
described later and to make decisions in the same way you would if you were in the situation presented. You will not 
know who the other participants in your group are. 
 
The money that you make in PART 1 will be called payoffs.  Payoffs are denoted in experimental currency units, or 
ECUs. At the end of this session, these ECUs will be converted into cash using the following exchange rate: for the 
Firm the exchange rate is 6 ECUs = £1, for the Official it is 5 ECUs = £1 and for the Citizen it is 4 ECUs = £1. 
 
The situation you will be facing is the following. The Firm has to decide whether it wants to offer the Official a bribe 
or not. The Official has to decide whether to accept the bribe or not. The Citizen has two choices: to punish the Firm 
and/or the Official for offering and accepting the bribe respectively, or not to punish them. We will now provide you 
with detailed instructions for each role. 
 
Detailed Instructions for Firms 
In today’s experiment, if you are a Firm, you have to decide whether to offer the Official a bribe or not. If you 
decide not to offer a bribe, then the participants get the following amounts: the Firm gets 60 ECUs, the Official gets 
30 ECUs, and the Citizen gets 80 ECUs. If you choose to offer a bribe, then you have to choose how much to offer. 
You incur a cost of 2 ECUs for offering this bribe regardless of whether the Official accepts it or not. You can 
choose to offer an amount B, where B can be a whole number in between 4 and 8, i.e., B = (4, 5, 6, 7, 8).  
 
Detailed Instructions for Officials 
In today’s experiment, if you are an Official, at the moment you make your decision, you do not know yet the 
decision taken by the Firm in your group. Therefore, you need to make a decision for each possible choice that can 
be made by the Firm in your group. That is, for any possible amount of the bribe (B) that the Firm can offer, you 
have to decide whether to accept the bribe or not. Depending on the Firm’s choice, one of your decisions will 
become payoff relevant at the end of the experiment. If you decide not to accept the bribe, then the Firm gets 58, the 
Official gets 30, and the Citizen gets 80 ECUs. If you accept the bribe, then, conditional on the Citizen’s actions, the 
payoffs can be of two types. If the Citizen decides not to punish, then the following payoffs occur: Firm gets 60 – 2 
+ 3B, Official gets 30 + 3B, and Citizen gets 80 – 7B, where B is the amount of bribe offered by the Firm. If the 
Citizen decides to punish, then the following payoffs occur: Firm gets 60 – 2 + 3B – 3PF, Official gets 30 + 3B – 3PO 
and the Citizen gets 80 – 7B – (PF + PO), where PF and PO denote the amount of punishment chosen by the Citizen 
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for the Firm and the Official, respectively. The payoffs indicate that the bribe B offered by the firm gets multiplied 
by 3, if you decide to accept the bribe but this in turn will reduce the citizen’s payoff by 7 times the amount of the 
bribe. If the Citizen decides to punish, the amount of punishment also gets multiplied by 3. 
 
Detailed Instructions for Citizens 
If you are a Citizen in today’s experiment, at the moment you make your decision, you do not know yet the decisions 
taken by the Firm and the Official in your group. Therefore you need to make a decision for each possible bribe 
amount that can be offered by the Firm and accepted by the Official in your group. That is, for any possible amount 
of the bribe (B) that the Firm could offer and the Official could accept, you have to decide whether to punish them or 
not. If the Firm offers a bribe and the Official accepts it, one of your decisions will become payoff relevant at the 
end of the experiment. If the Firm and the Official in your group have offered and accepted a bribe respectively, 
your payoff automatically gets reduced by 7 times the amount of the bribe, B. This is the harm you suffer as a result 
of the act of bribery. You can punish the Firm, the Official or both of them if you wish. If you choose to punish the 
Firm, then you can choose a whole number in between 1 and 6, i.e., PF = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) as the amount of the 
punishment. If you choose to punish the Official, then you can choose a whole number in between 1 and 6, i.e., PO = 
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) as the amount of the punishment. If you decide to punish the Firm but not the Official, then the 
corresponding value of PO will be 0. Similarly, if you decide to punish the Official but not the Firm, then the 
corresponding value of PF will be 0. Each monetary amount of punishment that you choose will be multiplied by 3, 
and the corresponding payoffs of the Official and the Firm will be reduced by this tripled amount. Your payoff will 
be reduced by the sum of the amount of punishment you have chosen to assign to the Firm and the Official. 
The exact payoffs will be: Firm gets 60 – 2 + 3B – 3PF, Official gets 30 + 3B – 3PO, and Citizen gets 80 – 7B – (PF + 
PO). If you decide not to punish, then the payoffs will be: Firm gets 60 – 2 + 3B, Official gets 30 + 3B, and Citizen 
gets 80 – 7B. 
If you are a Citizen, you will see the following screen, where you need to enter your decisions.  
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Each row of the table you see in the screenshot represents one possible bribe amount which can be offered by the 
Firm and accepted by the Official. For each possible bribe amount, you have to enter the following decisions in the 
space provided: a) whether you want to punish the Firm and, if so, by how much, and b) whether you want to punish 
the Official and, if so, by how much. For instance, the first row of the table represents the case where the Firm 
decides to offer a bribe of 4 and the Official accepts. In the space provided on that row, you need to enter whether 
you want to punish the Firm and/or the Official by selecting “yes” or “no” in the corresponding cells. If you answer 
“yes” to either or both of these two questions, then you need to enter the amount of punishment you want to assign 
for the Firm and/or the Official in each of the two corresponding large boxes. If you answer “no” to either or both of 
these questions, then you need to leave empty the corresponding large box. Similarly, you also need to enter your 
decisions for the cases where the Firm decides to offer a bribe of 5, 6, 7 and 8 and the Official accepts, represented 
in the second, third, fourth and fifth row of the table, respectively. 
 
Figure 1 describes the general set-up and summarizes the structure of the experiment.  
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Control questionnaire 
 
To make sure everyone understands the instructions, please complete the questions below. In a couple of minutes 
someone will come to your desk to check your answers. Once everybody answers the following questions correctly, 
PART 1 of the experiment will start. (The decisions and payoffs used for the questions below are simply for 
illustrative purposes. In the experiment decisions and payoffs will depend on the actual choices of the participants.) 
 
1. Suppose that the Firm has decided to make a bribe of 6. The Official has decided to reject the bribe if the Firm 
offers a bribe of 5, 6 and 7 and to accept the bribe if the Firm offers a bribe of 4 and 8. The Citizen has decided to 
punish neither the Firm nor the Official. 
a) What is the payoff of the Firm?          
b) What is the payoff of the Official?         
c) What is the payoff of the Citizen?         
 
2. Suppose that the Firm has decided to offer a bribe of 8. The Official has decided to reject the bribe if the Firm 
offers a bribe of 4 and 5 and to accept the bribe if the Firm offers a bribe of 6, 7 and 8. The Citizen has decided to 
choose 1, 3 and 4 as the amount of punishment for the Firm if it offers a bribe of 4, 5 and 6, respectively. The Citizen 
has decided not to punish the Firm if it offers a bribe of 7 and 8. The Citizen has decided not to punish the Official. 
a) What is the payoff of the Firm?          
b) What is the payoff of the Official?         
c) What is the payoff of the Citizen?         
 
3. Suppose that the Firm has decided to offer a bribe of 5. The Official has decided to reject the bribe if the Firm 
offers a bribe of 4 and 7 and to accept the bribe if the Firm offers a bribe of 5, 6 and 8. The Citizen has decided to 
choose 1, 3 and 4 as the amount of punishment for the Official if the Firm offers a bribe of 5, 6 and 7, respectively. 
The Citizen has decided not to punish the Official if the Firm offers a bribe of 4 and 8. The Citizen has decided not 
to punish the Firm. 
a) What is the payoff of the Firm?          
b) What is the payoff of the Official?         
c) What is the payoff of the Citizen?         
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PART 2 
In PART 2 of today’s experiment, we will ask you and all other participants to evaluate different possible choices an 
individual might make. Specifically, we will describe a choice that an individual might have made, and you should 
decide whether making that choice would be “socially appropriate” and “consistent with moral or proper social 
behaviour” or “socially inappropriate” and “inconsistent with moral or proper social behaviour.” By socially 
appropriate, we mean behaviour that most people agree is the “correct” or “ethical” thing to do. Another way to 
think about what we mean is that, if someone were to make a socially inappropriate choice, then someone observing 
this behaviour might get angry at the person who made the choice for acting in that manner. 
In each of your responses, we would like you to evaluate what constitutes socially appropriate or inappropriate 
behaviour. To give you an idea, consider the following example.  
Someone is at a local cafe. While there, the person notices that someone has left a wallet at one of the tables. How 
appropriate would it be to take the wallet for yourself? 
Very 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very 
socially 
appropriate 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
If this were the situation we asked you about in the study, you would indicate the extent to which you believe taking 
the wallet would be "socially appropriate" and "consistent with moral or proper social behaviour" or "socially 
inappropriate" and "inconsistent with moral or proper social behaviour".  Recall that by socially appropriate we 
mean behaviour that most people agree is the "correct" or "ethical" thing to do. 
For example, suppose you thought that taking the wallet was very socially inappropriate. Then, you would indicate 
your response by selecting the first box.  
For each choice you make, we will compare your response to the response of one other randomly selected 
participant to this session.  If you give the same response as the one provided by the selected other participant, 
then you will receive an additional £0.50. This amount will be paid to you, along with your other earnings, at the 
conclusion of the experiment. 
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For instance, in the example situation above, if your response had been "somewhat socially inappropriate," then you 
would receive an additional £0.50 if this was also the response provided by a randomly selected other participant in 
today’s session. Otherwise you would not receive any additional money for this question. 
Are there any questions about this task? Once we continue, you will see detailed descriptions of the choices you are 
to evaluate and instructions on how to proceed.  
If you have any questions at any time, please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to come to you. 
You will see how much you have earned from PART 2 at the end of the experiment.  
 
Question 1:  
Suppose that the manager of a firm would like a public official to award his/her firm a public contract, or grant it a 
permit or other benefit. How appropriate would it be for the manager to offer a bribe to the public official in such an 
instance? 
Very 
Socially 
Inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very 
socially 
appropriate 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
Question 2:  
Suppose that a public official is offered a bribe by the manager of a firm in exchange for awarding the firm a public 
contract, granting a permit or other benefit. How appropriate would it be for the public official to accept the bribe 
and grant the firm the contract, permit or other benefit?   
Very 
Socially 
Inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very 
socially 
appropriate 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Question 3:  
Suppose that a citizen is aware of an episode of bribery, having observed or been informed of the exchange of money 
for favours between a firm and a public official. 
A) How appropriate would it be for the citizen to punish the firm (for instance by reporting the bribe)? 
Very 
Socially 
Inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very 
socially 
appropriate 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
B) How appropriate would it be for the citizen to punish the public official (for instance by reporting the bribe)? 
Very 
Socially 
Inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very 
socially 
appropriate 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
